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Abstract—The family of Role-based Trust management lan-
guages is used for representing security policies by defining
a formalism, which uses credentials to handle trust in de-
centralized, distributed access control systems. A credential
provides information about the privileges of users and the se-
curity policies issued by one or more trusted authorities. The
main topic of this paper is RT⊖ , a language which provides
a carefully controlled form of non-monotonicity. The core
part of the paper defines two different semantics of RT⊖ lan-
guage – a relational, set-theoretic semantics for the language,
and an inference system, which is a kind of operational seman-
tics. The set-theoretic semantics maps roles to a set of entity
names. In the operational semantics credentials can be de-
rived from an initial set of credentials using a set of inference
rules. The soundness and the completeness of the inference
system with respect to the set-theoretic semantics of RT⊖ will
be proven.
Keywords—access control, inference system, monotonicity, Role-
based Trust management, set-theoretic semantics.
1. Introduction
Conﬁdential data, whether in electronic, paper or other
form must be properly protected. Guaranteeing that the
data and services oﬀered by a computer system are not
made available to unauthorized users is an increasingly
signiﬁcant and challenging issue, which must be solved
by reliable software technologies. This problem is usually
solved by implementing access control techniques. In a typ-
ical access control scenario there are two entities, one is
the requester that wants to access a protected resource,
while the other is an entity that is the resource owner or
provider. Usually these are the only entities involved in
making the authorization decision. This approach ﬁts well
into closed, centralized environments, in which the identity
of users is known in advance. Unfortunately, this simple
scenario does not apply to highly distributed and decen-
tralized networks. Quite diﬀerent challenges arise in such
decentralized and open systems, where the identity of users
is not known in advance and the set of users can change.
In decentralized environments, the resource owner and the
requester often are unknown to one another, making ac-
cess control based on identity ineﬀective. To be able to
deal with diﬀerent requesters coming from diﬀerent se-
curity domains, we need a more ﬂexible solution, named
trust management.
Trust management is an approach to access control in de-
centralized distributed systems, where access control de-
cisions are based on policy statements made by multiple
principals. The potential and ﬂexibility of trust manage-
ment approach stems from the possibility of delegation:
a principal may transfer limited authority over a resource
to other principals. Such a delegation is implemented by
means of an appropriate credential. This way, a set of cre-
dentials deﬁnes the access control strategy and allows de-
ciding on who is authorized to access a resource, and who
is not.
Despite the fact that the credentials-based models do,
to a large degree, solve the access control problem in open
systems, they still have some shortcomings. Most trust
management languages are monotonic: adding new asser-
tion to a query can never result in canceling an action,
which was accepted before [1]. It is a problem, because
each policy statement or credential added to the system
can only increase the capabilities and privileges granted
to others. The monotonicity property can simplify the de-
sign and analysis of complex network-based security pro-
tocols. It is a good property for researching, analyzing and
proving, but causes limited usability, because revocation of
privileges is not possible to assert. However, we can ﬁnd
in a literature various extensions of basic languages and
models that create negation on diﬀerent levels. And thus,
in this way we achieve a non-monotonicity. One of the ex-
tensions is Role-based Trust management language with
negation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview
of the work related to trust management systems and lan-
guages is given in Section 2. Section 3 shows the overview
of the family of Role-based Trust management languages,
Section 4 describes set-theoretic semantics of RT lan-
guages, including an example, and inference system over
RT credentials with example is shown in Section 5. Final
remarks are given in Conclusions.
2. Related Work
Traditional access control systems often rely on Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) model [2], which groups the ac-
cess rights by the role name and limits the access to a re-
source to those users, who are assigned to a particular role.
It is the most ﬂexible type of access control policy.
The ﬁrst trust management application described in the lit-
erature was PolicyMaker [3], which deﬁned a special
assertion language capable of expressing policy state-
ments, which were locally trusted, and credentials, which
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had to be signed using a private key. The next generation
of trust management languages were KeyNote [4], which
was an enhanced version of PolicyMaker, SPKI/SDSI [5]
and a few other languages [6]. All those languages allowed
assigning privileges to entities and used credentials to del-
egate permissions from its issuer to its subject. What was
missing in those languages was the possibility of delegation
based on attributes of the entities and not on their identity.
Responding to this need, a family of Role-based Trust man-
agement languages has been introduced in [7]–[9]. These
languages have a well-deﬁned syntax and semantics, which
made them easy to extend in order to apply them to dif-
ferent needs.
A set-theoretic semantics, which deﬁnes the meaning
of a set of credentials as a function from the set of roles into
the power set of entities, has been deﬁned for RT0 [10], [9]
and relational semantics, which apply to RT T in [11].
One of the extensions of RT languages is the use of time
validity constraints of the credentials, which made the lan-
guages of the RT family more realistic, because in the real
world permissions are usually given just for a limited pe-
riod of time. Time-dependant credentials were introduced
in [10] (for RT0) and in [12] (for RT T ). This type of time
constraints can eliminate the need of non-monotonic sys-
tem in some cases. Another approach to the monotonicity
feature is an extension of RT0 language, which was cre-
ated to manage trust in P2P applications and access control
in virtual communities described in [1].
3. Role-based Trust Management
Languages
The term of trust management was introduced in year 1996
by Blaze et al. in [13], who deﬁned it as a uniﬁed ap-
proach to specify and interpret security policies, credentials
and trust relationships. In a trust management system an
entity’s privilege is based on its attributes instead of its
identities. An entity’s attributes are demonstrated through
digitally signed credentials issued by multiple principals.
A credential is an attestation of qualiﬁcation, competence
or authority issued to an individual by a third party. Exam-
ples of credentials in real life include identiﬁcation doc-
uments, driver’s licenses, membership cards, keys, etc.
A credential in a computer system can be a digitally signed
document.
RT is a family of Role-based Trust management languages,
which combines trust management and RBAC features. To
deﬁne a trust management system, a language is needed
for describing entities (principals and requesters), creden-
tials and roles, which the entities play in the system.
RT0 is a simple yet powerful trust management language.
It is the core language of RT family, described in detail
in [9]. It allows describing localized authorities for roles,
role hierarchies, delegation of authority over roles and role
intersections. All the subsequent languages add new fea-
tures to RT0, they are progressively increasing in expres-
sive power and complexity. RT1 introduces parameter-
ized roles, which can represent relationships between enti-
ties. RT2 extends RT1 with logical objects, which can be
used to represent permissions given to entities with respect
to a group of logically related objects (resources). Those
extensions can help in keeping the notation concise, but do
not increase the expressive power of the language, because
each combination of parameters in RT1 and each permission
to a logical object in RT2 can be deﬁned alternatively as
a separate role in RT0. RTT language has been introduced
to support threshold and separation of duties policies. Sim-
ilar to a role, which deﬁnes a set of principals, a manifold
role deﬁnes a set of principal sets, each of which is a set
of principals whose cooperation satisﬁes the manifold role.
RTD provides mechanism to describe delegation of rights
and role activations, which can express selective use of ca-
pacities and delegation of these capacities, which are useful
when one wants to delegate authority temporarily. In many
scenarios, an entity prefers not to use all his privileges, all
the more, to delegate all his rights. RT⊖ provides a care-
fully controlled form of non-monotonicity. The members
of the RT family presented so far are monotonic: adding
a credential to the system can only result in granting ad-
ditional privileges, it cannot result in canceling an action,
which was accepted before. It is a problem, because each
policy statement or credential added to the system can only
increase the capabilities and privileges granted to others.
In [1], Czenko et al. argue that many access control deci-
sions in complex distributed systems, like virtual commu-
nities, are hard to model in a purely monotonic language.
They propose RT⊖, which adds to RT a restricted form of
negation called negation in context. RT⊖ introduces a new
operator ⊖ and the so called exclusion credential. It was
created to manage trust in P2P applications and access con-
trol in virtual communities. The features of RT T and RT D
can be combined together with the features of RT0, RT1
or RT2. A more detailed treatment of RT family can be
found in [8].
3.1. The Syntax of RT Family Languages
Basic elements of RT languages are entities, role names,
roles and credentials. Entities represent principals that
can deﬁne roles and issue credentials, and requesters that
can make requests to access resources. An entity can,
e.g., be a person or program identiﬁed by a user account
in a computer system or a public key. We denote an entity
by a name starting with an uppercase letter (or just an up-
percase letter), e.g., A, Alice, University. Role names rep-
resent permissions that can be issued by entities to other
entities or groups of entities. A role name is denoted by
a string starting with a lowercase letter (or just a lower-
case letter), like r or student. Roles denote sets of en-
tities that have particular permissions granted according
to the access control policy. Roles have the form of en-
tity followed by a role name, separated by a dot, like A.r
or University.student. Credentials deﬁne roles by appoint-
ing a new member of the role or by delegating authority
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to the members of other roles. There are four types of cre-
dentials in RT0, which are interpreted in the following way:
A.r ← B – simple membership: entity B is a mem-
ber of role A.r;
A.r ← B.s – simple inclusion: role A.r includes
(all members of) role B.s. This is a del-
egation of authority over r from A to B;
A.r ← B.s.t – linking inclusion: role A.r includes role
C.t for each C, which is a member
of role B.s. This is a delegation of au-
thority from A to all the members
of the role B.s;
A.r ← B.s∩C.t – intersection inclusion: role A.r in-
cludes all the entities who are mem-
bers of both roles B.s and C.t. This is
a partial delegation from A to B and C;
A.r ← B.s⊖C.t – exclusion: all members of B.s which
are not members of C.t are members
of A.r.
A policy is a ﬁnite set of credentials.
The languages discussed in this paper can be used, in gen-
eral, in very complex systems. Therefore, we present here
only a simpliﬁed example, with the intention to illustrate
the basic notions and the notation, with a focus on RT⊖
credentials.
Example 1. Suppose that John wants to share his pic-
tures and movies using ﬁle sharing system. John restricts
the access to his pictures to those of his friends, who are
a members of Picture Club and he gave similar restriction
to his movie, but he requires that his friends should be
members of Movie Club instead of Picture Club.
John can also create a list of people who are forbidden
to see the gallery of his private pictures, which means that
people, who are on the list can see the general gallery of
his pictures but not the private one.
The entire policy can be expressed as follows:
John.accessPic← John. f riend∩ John.pictureClub (1)
John.accessMov← John. f riend∩ John.movieClub (2)
John.privatePic← John.accessPic⊖ John.blackList (3)
Now, assume that the following credentials have been
added:
John. f riend ← Bob (4)
John. f riend ← Lily (5)
John. f riend ←Maria (6)
John. f riend ← So f ia (7)
John.pictureClub← Bob (8)
John.pictureClub← Etan (9)
John.pictureClub← Lily (10)
John.movieClub← Alice (11)
John.movieClub← Maria (12)
John.movieClub← So f ia (13)
John.blackList ← Bob (14)
Then one can conclude that, according to the policy, peo-
ple who have access to John’s pictures are Bob and Lily,
but only Lily has access to his private gallery, and Maria
and So f ia have access to John’s movies.
4. The Set-Theoretic Semantics
of RT Languages
A set-theoretic semantics of RT0, which deﬁnes the mean-
ing of a set of credentials as (monotone) function from the
set of roles into the power set of entities, has been originally
deﬁned in [9]. A slightly diﬀerent approach, closely related
to the semantics of RT0 language, was shown in [14], where
various semantic readings of Simple Distributed Security
Infrastructure (SDSI) were provided. A deﬁnition quoted
in this section is a modiﬁed version of the same seman-
tics, which has been introduced in [10], with addition of ⊖
operator.
Definition 1. The semantics of a set P of RT credentials,
denoted by SP , is the smallest relation Si, such that:
1. S0 = /0
2. Si+1 =
⋃
c∈P f (Si,c) for i = 0,1, . . .
which is closed with respect to function f , which de-
scribes the meaning of credentials in the following way
(A,B,C,X ,Y are entities):
f (Si,A.r ← X) = {(A,r,X)}
f (Si,A.r ← B.s) = {(A,r,X) : (B,s,X) ∈Si}
f (Si,A.r←B.s.t)=⋃C:(B,s,C)∈Si{(A,r,X) : (C,t,X)∈Si}
f (Si,A.r ← B.s∩C.t) = {(A,r,X) : (B,s,X) ∈Si
∧(C,t,X) ∈Si}
f (Si,A.r ← B.s⊖C.t) = {(A,r,X \Y ) : (B,s,X) ∈Si
∧(C,t,Y ) ∈Si}
Example 2. Set-theoretic semantics for Example 1
We use Example 1 from Section 3 to illustrate the deﬁnition
of RT semantics.
The sequence of steps to compute consecutive relations Si
is shown in Table 1. Consecutive sections of the table de-
scribe relations S0 through S3. Each section of Table 1
has exactly one row, which corresponds to the issuer
of the role, John. The columns of the table correspond
to role names. This way, a cell of the table shows the set
of entities, which are members of the respective role issued
by John.
The starting relation S0 is, by deﬁnition, empty. Ac-
cording to Deﬁnition 1, only credentials (4)–(14) are
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Table 1
The relations S0 through S4
John friend pictureClub movieClub blackList accessPic accessMov privatePic
S0 φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
S1
Bob Bob Alice
Bob φ φ φLily Etan Maria
Maria Lily So f iaSo f ia
S2
Bob Bob Alice
Bob Bob Maria φLily Etan Maria Lily So f iaMaria Lily So f iaSo f ia
S3
Bob Bob Alice
Bob Bob Maria LilyLily Etan Maria Lily So f iaMaria Lily So f iaSo f ia
mapped in S0 into nonempty sets by function f .
These sets are shown in relation S1 in Table 1.
In S1, credentials (1) and (2) are mapped into in-
stances (John,accessPic,Bob), (John,accessPic,Lily),
(John,accessMov,Maria), and (John,accessMov,So f ia)
of relation S2, and in S2, credential (3) is mapped into
instances (John, privatePic,Lily). The resulting relation
S3 cannot be changed using the given set of credentials,
hence
SP = S3
and it is the end of the set-theoretic semantics for Exam-
ple 1.
5. The Inference System
over RT Credentials
The member sets of roles can also be calculated in a more
convenient way (than set-theoretic semantics) using an in-
ference system, which deﬁnes an operational semantics
of RT languages. An inference system consists of an ini-
tial set of formulae that are considered to be true, and a set
of inference rules, that can be used to derive new formulae
from the known ones.
Let P be a given set of RT credentials. The application
of inference rules of the inference system will create new
credentials, derived from credentials of the set P . A de-
rived credential c will be denoted using a formula P ≻ c,
which should be read: credential c can be derived from
a set of credentials P .
Definition 2. The initial set of formulae of an inference
system over a set P of RT credentials are all the formulae
c ∈P ,
for each credential c in P .
The inference rules of the system are the following:
c ∈P
P ≻ c
(W1)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻ A.r ← X (W2)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s.t P ≻ B.s←C
P ≻C.t ← X
P ≻ A.r ← X
(W3)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s∩C.t P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻C.t ← X
P ≻ A.r ← X
(W4)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s⊖C.t P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻C.t ← Y
P ≻ A.r ← X \Y
(W5)
The ﬁve kinds of credentials described in Section 4 are
handled by the rules above. The rules should be self-ex-
planatory.
5.1. Soundness and Completeness of Inference System
over RT T Credentials
There could be a number of inference systems deﬁned over
a given language. To be useful for practical purposes an in-
ference system must exhibit two properties. First, it should
be sound, which means that the inference rules could derive
only formulae that are valid with respect to the semantics of
the language. Second, it should be complete, which means
that each formula, which is valid according to the seman-
tics, should be derivable in the system.
Due to space constraints, we only present sketches of proofs
and proofs for (W5) formula (introduced in the RT⊖ lan-
guage), full proofs for the rest formulae can be found
in [15]. The semantics of a set P of RT credentials,
deﬁned by the inference system, is given by a set of all
the formulae of the type: P ≻ A.r ← X .
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To prove the soundness of such a formula, one must prove
that the triple (A,r,X) belongs to the semantics SP of the
set of credentials P . Let us ﬁrst note that all the formulae
P ≻ A.r ← X , such that A.r ← X ∈P are sound. This is
proved in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If A.r ← X ∈P then (A,r,X) ∈SP .
Proof. The relation SP , which deﬁnes the semantics of
P , is a limit of a monotonically increasing sequence of
sets S0,S1, . . ., such that S0 = /0. According to Deﬁni-
tion 1: f (S0,A.r ← X) = (A,r,X). Hence,(A,r,X) ∈ S1
and because S1 ⊆SP then (A,r,X) ∈SP .

To prove the soundness of the inference system over P , we
must prove the soundness of each formula P ≻ A.r ← X ,
which can be derived from the set P . This is proven in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. If P ≻ A.r ← X then (A,r,X) ∈SP .
Proof. By induction with respect to the number n of
inference steps, which are needed to derive a for-
mula P ≻ A.r ← X . If n = 1 then the formula
P ≻ A.r ← X could be derived only using rule (W1),
because the premises of only this rule are axioms. Hence,
the thesis is true according to Lemma 1. For the induc-
tive step, assume that the thesis is true if the number of
inference steps was not greater than n. Then, it is possible
to show that it is true also in a case when the number of in-
ference steps equals n+1. Since any one of the rules (W2)
through (W5) could be used in the last (n + 1) step of in-
ference, all those four cases should be discussed separately,
analyzing the premises and using Deﬁnition 1 to show that
the thesis holds. As it was mentioned before, a proof for
the rule (W5) is provided, see [15] for rules (W2)–(W4).
(W5) The ﬁst premise of (W5) cannot be derived otherwise
than using (W1). Hence, A.r ← B.s⊖C.t ∈ P . The sec-
ond premise of (W5): P ≻ B.s← X was derived from P
using at most n steps of inference, hence, (B,s,X) ∈ SP
according to the inductive hypothesis. By Deﬁnition 1, there
exists such Si that (B,s,X) ∈ Si. Similarly, in the case
of the third premise of (W5): P ≻ C.t ← Y , there ex-
ists such S j that (C,t,Y ) ∈ S j. Let k be the maximum
of (i, j). Then (B,s,X) ∈ Sk, (C,t,Y ) ∈ Sk and (A,r,X \
Y ) ∈ f (Sk,A.r ← B.s⊖C.t) according to f (Si,A.r ←
B.s⊖C.t) = {(A,r,X \Y ) : (B,s,X) ∈ Si ∧ (C,t,Y ) ∈ Si}.
Because f (Sk,A.r ← B.s ⊖ C.t) ⊆ Sk+1 ⊆ SP then
(A,r,X \Y ) ∈SP .

To prove the completeness of the inference system over
a set P of RT credentials, one must prove that a formula
P ≻ A.r← X can be derived using inference rules for each
element (A,r,X) ∈SP . This is proven in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If (A,r,X) ∈SP then P ≻ A.r ← X .
Proof. Assume (A,r,X) ∈ SP . By Deﬁnition 1, there
exists such i≥ 0 and such c ∈P that (A,r,X) ∈ f (Si,c).
The proof of the thesis is by induction with respect
to the value of index i. If i = 0 then credential c must
take the form of A.r ← X . This is because S0 = /0 and
f (S0,d) = /0 for each credential d other than A.r ← X .
Hence, A.r ← X ∈P and the formula P ≻ A.r ← X can
be derived using rule (W1). For the inductive step, assume
that the thesis is true, if the value of index i in the ex-
pression (A,r,X) ∈ f (Si,c) was not greater than n. Then
it suﬃces to show that it is true also in a case when the
value of index i equals (n + 1). Assume (A,r,X) ∈ SP
and (A,r,X) ∈ f (Sn+1,c) for a certain c ∈ P . The cre-
dential c can take one of the ﬁve forms allowed in RT0 and
RT⊖. Each of these types of credentials should be discussed
separately, showing that it can be derived using one of
the rules (W1)–(W5). Deﬁnition 1 is used in all cases except
c = A.r← B, which trivially results from (W1). As it was
mentioned before, a proof for c = A.r ← B.s⊖C.t is pro-
vided, see [15] for rules (W2)–(W4).
c = A.r← B.s⊖C.t: If (A,r,X) ∈ f (Sn+1,A.r ← B.s⊖
C.t), then according to Deﬁnition 1, f (Si,A.r ← B.s⊖
C.t) = {(A,r,X \Y ) : (B,s,X) ∈ Si ∧ (C,t,Y ) ∈ Si}, there
exist two sets of entities Z, Y such that Z \Y = X and
(B,s,Z) ∈ Sn+1 and (C,t,Y ) ∈ Sn+1. Hence, there ex-
ist credentials c1, c2 such that (B,s,Z) ∈ f (Sn,c1) and
(C,t,Y ) ∈ f (Sn,c2). This implies that (B,s,Z) ∈SP and
(C,t,Y ) ∈ SP , hence, P ≻ B.s← Z and P ≻ C.t ← Y
according to the inductive hypothesis. P ≻ A.r ← X is
a conclusion of rule (W5).

A conclusion from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 is such that
the inference system of Deﬁnition 1 is sound and com-
plete with respect to the semantics of RT credentials. This
way, the inference system gives an operational deﬁnition
of RT semantics (for RT0 and RT⊖) and it proves that the in-
ference system provides an alternative way of presenting
the semantics of RT .
Example 3. (Inference system for Example 1):
We use the inference system to formally derive entities
which can have access to John′s galleries. Using creden-
tials (1)–(14) according to rule (W1) it can infer:
John.accessPic← John. f riend∩ John.picClub∈P
P ≻ John.accessPic← John. f riend∩ John.picClub
John.accessMov← John. f riend∩ John.movieClub∈P
P ≻ John.accessMov← John. f riend∩ John.movieClub
John.privatePic← John.accessPic⊖ John.blackList ∈P
P ≻ John.privatePic← John.accessPic⊖ John.blackList
John. f riend ← Bob ∈P
P ≻ John. f riend ← Bob
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John. f riend ← Lily ∈P
P ≻ John. f riend ← Lily
John. f riend ← Maria ∈P
P ≻ John. f riend ←Maria
John. f riend ← So f ia ∈P
P ≻ John. f riend ← So f ia
John.pictureClub← Bob ∈P
P ≻ John.pictureClub← Bob
John.pictureClub← Etan ∈P
P ≻ John.pictureClub← Etan
John.pictureClub← Lily ∈P
P ≻ John.pictureClub← Lily
John.movieClub← Alice ∈P
P ≻ John.movieClub← Alice
John.movieClub← Maria ∈P
P ≻ John.movieClub←Maria
John.movieClub← So f ia ∈P
P ≻ John.movieClub← So f ia
John.blackList ← Bob ∈P
P ≻ John.blackList ← Bob
Then, using credentials (1), (4), (5), (8), (10), and rule (W4)
we infer:
P ≻ John.accessPic ← John. f riend∩ John.pictureClub
P ≻ John. f riend ← Bob P ≻ John.pictureClub ← Bob
P ≻ John.accessPic← Bob
P ≻ John.accessPic ← John. f riend∩ John.pictureClub
P ≻ John. f riend ← Lily P ≻ John.pictureClub ← Lily
P ≻ John.accessPic← Lily
showing that the group of people who can see John’s pic-
tures are Bob and Lily.
In the next step the newly inferred credentials and addition-
ally credentials (3) and (14) with the rule (W5) is used:
P ≻ John.privatePic← John.accessPic⊖John.blackList
P ≻ John.accessPic ← Bob P ≻ John.accessPic← Lily
John.blackList ← Bob
P ≻ John.privatePic← Lily
showing that only Lily can see John’s private collection.
Additionally, if we want to ﬁnd a group of people, who can
see John’s movies, we can do this using credentials (2), (6),
(7), (12), (13), and rule (W4). We infer:
P ≻ John.accessMov ← John. f riend∩ John.movieClub
P ≻ John. f riend ←Maria P ≻ John.movieClub ←Maria
P ≻ John.accessMov← Maria
P ≻ John.accessMovie ← John. f riend∩ John.movieClub
P ≻ John. f riend ← So f ia P ≻ John.movieClub ← So f ia
P ≻ John.accessMov← Sofia
showing that the group of people who can see John’s
movies are Maria and So f ia.
6. Conclusions
This paper deals with modeling of trust management sys-
tems in decentralized and distributed environments. The
modeling framework is a family of Role-based Trust man-
agement languages, especially RT0 and RT⊖ languages.
Two types of semantics for RT credentials have been intro-
duced in the paper.
A set-theoretic semantics of RT languages is deﬁned as
a relation over a set of roles and a set of entities.
An operational semantics of RT languages is deﬁned as an
inference system, in which credentials can be derived from
an initial set of credentials using a set of inference rules.
The semantics is given by the set of resulting credentials of
the type A.r←X , which explicitly show a mapping between
roles and sets of entities.
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